Analysis
D was a close friend of the deceased and the sole beneficiary under the deceased’s will. C was the deceased’s niece. C claimed that a collection of jewellery in the estate was impressed with a secret trust in her favour, or alternatively that D was estopped from denying that the jewellery was held for C’s benefit.
C alleged that, in a Skype conversation in March 2013, the deceased had suggested that she wanted C to have her jewellery, C had said this was very generous and that she would love to receive it; that the deceased had said that rather than leaving it to C in the will, she would leave it to D who would give it to her on her birthdays and at Christmas; and that D had agreed to that suggestion. C also said that D had encouraged her to believe that there was a trust or obligation relating to the jewellery in her favour and that she had relied on this by not challenging the deceased’s will in proceedings in Monaco. C’s case was also that there was a physical list setting out the jewellery and the dates on which it would be given to C.
D denied that a Skype conversation in the terms alleged by C had taken place. D said that the deceased asked him to ‘look after’ the jewellery and that it would be ‘nice’ if he passed some of it on, if he so wished, to family members and friends, and that he could also sell pieces if he absolutely needed to. He denied making representations that he would honour a trust or obligation relating to the jewellery in C’s favour, and alternatively denied that C had relied on them or suffered detriment. He pointed out that C was still able to challenge the will in Monaco. D denied that there was a physical list of jewellery as alleged.
Held:
To prove a secret trust, C had to prove: an intention by the deceased to create a trust, satisfying the traditional ‘three certainties’; the communication of the trust to the legatee; and acceptance of the trust by the legatee (including silent or deemed acceptance) (McCormick v Grogan [1867], Re Snowden deceased [1979], and Kasperbauer v Griffiths [2000] referred to). An intention to create a trust was to be distinguished from a mere moral or family obligation (Re Snowdon referred to). C’s allegations did not amount to allegations of fraud so the ordinary approach to standard of proof applied (Re Snowdon referred to).
It was highly improbable that the Skype conversation took place in March 2013 as alleged. In March 2013, the deceased had contemplated a will in favour of C, and did make such a will in April 2013. The jewellery therefore would have formed part of the estate which C was going to receive absolutely.
C’s counsel had asked the court to ignore the date given in C’s evidence and that the contents of the alleged conversation were more important than the date. In a sense this was true, but it was for C to prove on the balance of probabilities that a secret trust was created. Absent a written record, her case depended on her oral evidence. The fact that a crucial date was obviously wrong did not give confidence in the strength of her recollection, and she did not seek to correct the date in oral evidence.
The court concluded that no conversation had ever taken place in the terms alleged by C in which D was present.
The court also concluded that the deceased and D did not prepare a physical list of items, let alone an inventory as alleged by C.
These conclusions were fortified by the history of the dispute, in which C and her father’s initial concern was that Neil would not make a will leaving assets from Patricia’s estate to C’s children. There had been no mention of the jewellery in the first formal letter in December 2015, and subsequent references to it were sporadic, with the first formal claim to the jewellery being made in September 2018, no less than 3.5 years after C became aware of the terms of the deceased’s will. This supported the conclusion that C and her father did not believe D to be under any enforceable obligation to deal with the jewellery in any particular way, and nothing had been said by either the deceased or D which could be regarded as imposing a trust. It was always regarded by them as no more than a moral obligation.
While D had given evidence in his divorce proceedings which might be taken to support C’s case that he regarded himself as a trustee of the jewellery, this was ambiguous on its face. His answers were not wholly consistent, but overall the court was satisfied that his evidence was truthful and accurate.
The court also took account of four further matters. First, the purpose behind the deceased’s wish that D should pass on items of jewellery to C and her family was to foster an ongoing relationship between them. That would be undermined if D was a bare trustee so that C could simply call for the jewellery. Secondly, if the deceased had simply wanted to pass the jewellery to C, she could have done so in the will. Thirdly, D’s understanding of the deceased’s wishes was that he could pass on jewellery to the deceased’s friends, her maid, and C’s mother (which he did). Fourthly, given the relationship between D and the deceased, it was unlikely that she contemplated enforcement of her wishes by court processes.
The proprietary estoppel also failed for four reasons. First, D never made the statement relied upon that he had a list setting out the jewellery and the dates on which it would be given to C. Secondly, C did not rely on statements by D referring to himself as ‘custodian’. All of the facts regarding the will were known to C by March 2015, and particularly the fact that she and her children did not benefit. She discussed challenging the will with her father, and he had intimated a claim as early as December 2015. The decision not to challenge the will was made long before the alleged statements. Thirdly, C had suffered no detriment since she still had the right to challenge the will. Any loss of tactical advantage was attributable to decisions taken from 2015 onwards not to challenge the will. Fourthly, in any event, a loss of a supposed tactical advantage was too nebulous and hypothetical in this case to amount to a detriment for this purpose.
JUDGMENT MASTER RHYS: The Claim [1] This is a claim brought against the sole beneficiary of the estate of Patricia Ann Richards deceased who died in Monaco on 22nd February 2015. By her will dated 21st February 2014 (‘the 2014 Will’), the Deceased left her entire estate to the Defendant, a close friend of hers, …Continue reading "Titcombe v Ison [2021] WTLR 1101"