Analysis
By her will dated 27 June 2016 (the will) Audrey Thelma Anita Arkell (the testatrix) appointed the defendants as executors and gave a nil-rate band legacy, defined as the largest sum of cash which could be given without any inheritance tax becoming due on the transfer of value deemed to be made immediately before her death, to the first defendant. The testatrix then gave to the first defendant a specific devise, a specific bequest and her personal chattels free of tax. Pecuniary legacies were also given free of tax to other legatees and the net residuary estate was divided between the claimant (a charity) and 20 other charities. The testatrix died on 17 August 2017 and probate was granted in respect to a net estate of £3,127,174 on 1 August 2019. A Part 8 claim form was issued on 24 July 2020 for a declaration that, on its true construction, no sum was due to the first defendant in satisfaction of the nil-rate band legacy contained in clause 4 of the will.
Held (granting the declaration):
The Supreme Court had confirmed in Marley v Rawlings [2014] that a will is construed in the same way as any other document, the aim being to identify the intention of the party or parties to the document by interpreting the words used in their documentary, factual and commercial context. It had previously been confirmed in RSPCA v Sharp [2010] that in the absence of any extrinsic evidence as to the testator’s wishes, their intentions could only be discerned through the language which they used in the will, construed as a whole within the relevant context. The importance of both text and context to the process of construction was summarised in Wood v Capita Insurance Services [2017] – textualism and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms in the field of contractual interpretation; rather, they are useful tools to ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have chosen to express their agreement. In this case, the definition of ‘the Nil-Rate Sum’ could not be ignored and, in the absence of any extrinsic evidence as to the testatrix’s intention, it was speculation on the part of the first defendant as to what were her wishes. No application had been brought by him seeking rectification of the will and, as the value of the other gifts to the first defendant and pecuniary legatees were far in excess of the upper limit of the available nil-rate band, it followed that the claimant was correct in contending that no sum was payable under clause 4 of the will. When the will was made, this was not an inevitable result; it was possible that the testatrix might have realised or restructured her assets if, for example, she needed care that could not be provided in her home. If the other gifts had failed, the first defendant would have received an amount up to the value of the unused balance of the nil-rate band.
JUDGMENT MASTER SHUMAN: [1] This is a will construction claim brought by the claimant arising out of the will of Audrey Thelma Anita Arkell (the deceased) executed on 27 June 2016 (the will). The deceased died on 17 August 2017. [2] The deceased’s estate has a net probate value before inheritance tax of £3,127,174. [3] …Continue reading "Royal Commonwealth Socitety for the Blind v Beasant & anr [2021] WTLR 1457"