Analysis
This was an appeal against quantum in an application under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975. The deceased was called Melita Jackson and the appellant was her estranged daughter.
The proceedings had a protracted history. There was an initial hearing of the claim in front of District Judge Million on 7 August 2007. He found as facts that the appellant and her husband and family lived modestly in a housing association house. They were heavily dependent on state benefits. The appellant did not work and her husbands income was small. The family’s current standard of living was low. The judge made various further findings about the appellant and her family’s income.
At the hearing below the district judge found that the appellant would be likely to remain in some financial need, despite the possibility of taking up paid work. Having conducted various rough calculations he found that a capital sum of £69,200 would be required to provide a maintenance figure of £4,000 per annum, such a sum being based on the tax credits of which the appellant was currently in receipt. Taking into account that the appellant ought to be able to find some work and in order to reflect that potentially reduced financial dependency the district judge capitalised the maintenance figure at the lower sum of £50,000. The district judge explicitly stated that such a figure had a significant degree of approximation in it but that it was the best he could do in the circumstances.
The district judge also held that the appellant met the threshold eligibility test as an applicant under the Act in that the lack of provision was unreasonable. This decision was the subject of a cross-appeal to the High Court and a further appeal to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal concurred with the district judge.
In the current appeal on quantum the appellant sought an award equivalent to half the value of the estate in order to rehouse in a three-bedroom property in an area of a better standard than her own. Further sums were later put forward in argument. The appellant submitted that the district judge had erred in law on a wide variety of points. These submissions were summarised by the judge in the Court of Appeal as being in essence that having found that reasonable provision had not been made, it could not have been reasonable of the district judge to order a sum which would in reality provide no benefit to the appellant. The reason for this submission was that unless the appellant’s housing needs were met, the effect of the means testing of her state benefits would be that any award would be expended on living expenses relatively quickly. In addition there were two supplementary grounds of appeal, which were (1) that as the appellant’s lack of expectancy from the deceased’s estate did not prejudice her case at the gateway stage the judge should not have taken it into account at the quantum stage, and (2) that the appellant’s mother had received a large sum following the death of the appellant’s father and that this changed the facts on which the district judge relied.
Held:
- 1) The second supplementary ground of appeal was dismissed. The sum could not be said to derive from the appellant’s father and therefore it could not be said that it was reasonable to provide her with it. There was no evidence that it was anything other than a payment to the appellant’s mother as a widow.
- 2) The first supplementary ground of appeal was dismissed. Section 3 of the Act sets out a number of criteria to be considered by the court. Those criteria have to be considered at both the gateway stage and the evaluative stage. The court is engaged in a different exercise at the two stages. The district judge took the view that the lack of expectancy did not fail to make the lack of provision unreasonable. However, the exercise of finding quantum is different and the district judge was not wrong to take it into account later as well. The lack of expectancy will fall into s3(1)(g) of the Act.
- 3) It was not possible to say that the district judge was wrong in taking the view that notwithstanding that the appellant and her family lived in straightened circumstances, the fact that they had done so for many years did not justify an award that improved their circumstances.
- 4) The appeal was dismissed.
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