Analysis
Wynne Evans (Wynne) died on 2 September 2006 at the age of 79. He had worked on a farm from the age of 14. The farm latterly belonged to the defendants, David Lloyd (David) and his wife Elizabeth Lloyd (Elizabeth). Previously it had belonged to David’s parents and grandparents.
There was an issue as to whether Wynne had died testate or intestate. The claimants argued he died intestate but the defendants argued that he died testate and that the will, of which David was residuary beneficiary, had been lost.
The first claimant Howell Evans (Howell) is Wynne’s sole surviving brother and his intestacy beneficiary. The second claimant, David Bernard Evans (Bernard), is a cousin of Howell and of Wynne. He and his wife, the third claimant, held a power of attorney for Howell and were also the residuary beneficiaries of his will.
On 24 December 1996 Wynne conveyed Tanyfron, one of two parcels of agricultural land he had inherited from an elder brother, Ieuan, to David and Elizabeth. On 9 January 1997 he conveyed the other, Waenhir, to them. The two parcels of land represented substantially all of his estate. The defendants contacted their solicitor to deal with the conveyancing and paid for the work. The solicitor did not recall his conversations with Wynne but gave evidence that he had regarded Wynne as his client and of his usual practice in such situations. There was also positive evidence, which the judge accepted, that the gift of the property was Wynne’s idea.
The judge found that although Wynne was a servant, there was notable closeness between him and the Lloyd family. He had known them over several generations and he was particularly close to David. Despite a 31-year age difference they had shared a bedroom until David was married. Wynne’s life had revolved around the farm. He worked hard and until his final illness he had never spent a night away from it. Wynne was paid an appropriate wage until he was 65. Thereafter he retired and was not paid a wage. However, he continued to work as before, slowing down as age and ill health dictated.
The judge also found that Wynne was an independent man who read newspapers and could engage in political debate. There was no positive evidence of any kind that the Lloyds had ever directed his financial affairs.
In relation to undue influence, the claimants argued that the relationship between Wynne and the Lloyds contained the factors necessary to bring the principle of into action: that Wynne had lived in the Lloyds’ home all his adult life; he was employed by them for all of that time; his entire adult life was defined by the Lloyds; and that his lack of education and experience made him wholly unequipped for independent existence. Further, that the relationship was characterised by complete trust and affection. The claimants further argued that as Wynne was giving away all of his property when there was no need to do so it was clear that the transaction called for an explanation. In the circumstances they submitted that the transactions should be set aside for undue influence.
The defendants argued that the evidence did not disclose the necessary relationship of dependence between Wynne and the Lloyds; any ascendency by them over him; any vulnerability in his position; or that he reposed trust and confidence in them in the management of his financial affairs.
The claimants also argued that the gifts were unconscionable transactions. They submitted that Wynne was of a lower income group and less highly educated than the Lloyds and at a special disadvantage because of his dependence on them for employment, board, and accommodation. Further, that the transaction was oppressive as it involved Wynne giving away all the property of substance he owned. They claimed that the defendants’ conduct was unconscionable as they knew of Wynne’s disadvantage and took no steps to dissuade him from the gift or encourage him to take independent legal advice.
The defendants raised defences of laches, estoppel and acquiescence. The estoppel being on the factual basis, which the judge accepted, that in reliance on Wynne’s gift the defendants expended time, labour and money on the renovation of Tanyfron.
The defendants also counterclaimed to the effect that Wynne left a will in their favour, which had been lost. The claim was made on the basis that when sorting out some papers after Wynne’s death, Elizabeth had found an unexecuted draft will prepared by solicitors in 1985, which named David as residuary beneficiary. There was some evidence that a copy might have been executed but no such version came to light.
Held:
- (1) The conveyances of Waenhir and Tanyfron should not be set aside on grounds of undue influence. Undue influence is directed to the question of independence of the will. Wynne and the Lloyds were clearly very close and he depended on them for various practical matters. However, the evidence in the present case did not indicate that in a relevant sense Wynne was in a relationship of dependence towards the Lloyds, or that they had ascendency over him, or that he reposed trust and confidence in them in the management of his affairs. Moreover, given the judge’s acceptance that the conveyance was Wynne’s idea, the claimants would have had to show that Wynne’s own judgement was controlled by his perception of what was expected of him. This was not proven.
- (2) Further, in all the circumstances, the transactions were accounted for by reference to the ordinary motives by which people are accustomed to act. Just because the nature of the transaction was highly unusual did not mean that it could not be accounted for by normal human motivation. The circumstances of cases are almost infinitely variable and this was an unusual case.
- (3) Were the evidential burden to have shifted to the defendants, the judge would have found it had been discharged. The requirement of a fully informed will must be applied practically with regard to what matters are and are not material to the case. In the circumstances, such legal advice as the solicitor acting on the conveyance stated that he would have provided would have been sufficient.
- (4) Wynne was indeed ‘poor’ or ‘ignorant’ in the sense described by Megarry J in Cresswell v Potter [1978] and the transactions were disadvantageous to him. However the claimants failed to show that the defendants’ conduct was unconscionable in the sense that their behaviour was morally culpable or reprehensible. As a result the transactions could not be set aside as unconscionable.
- (5) If the gifts had been voidable by reason of undue influence, no failure to object to the defendants’ use of the property while the relationship subsisted would have rendered them unimpeachable. If a relationship of undue influence had existed then there would have been no basis for holding that it ended before Wynne’s death. Therefore if the judge had considered that the gifts were otherwise liable to be set aside, relief would not have been refused on the basis of anything done in Wynne’s lifetime gave rise to an estoppel. If the gifts had been set aside, it would have been possible to make an allowance to the defendants for their work.
- (6) The doctrine of laches provides a defence to claims not brought within a reasonable time. Wynne’s death was the earliest appropriate time to take as a starting point. The claim was brought almost six years thereafter. Howell’s actions in the intervening period were either sufficient to amount to a waiver of any claim against them, or if not then by his conduct and neglect he had put the defendants in a position in which it would now be unreasonable and unjust to assert a remedy against them. If it had been necessary, the defence of laches would have been upheld. In the circumstances acquiescence added nothing to the defences.
- (7) The evidence fell far short of permitting an inference that Wynne’s will had been executed. Accordingly the counterclaim failed.
Continue reading "Evans & ors v Lloyd & anr [2013] EWHC 1725 (Ch)"